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Warfighting is an authentic American philosophy of action that will thrill the millions of fans of SunTzu's The Art of War and Musashi's T he Book of Five Rings .
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Published 2 September The project aims to: engage with industry technology providers of all sizes to explore what innovative approaches to traditional issues can be leveraged to give the army a competitive edge expose capability and knowledge gaps explore technology ready for rapid exploitation create a community of industry partners that will encourage a collaborative approach to problem solving AWE20 seeks to answer the following questions: How can technology: improve data exploitation for situational awareness and understanding enable us to make faster and better-informed decisions reduce the detectability and improve the resilience and agility of HQs at all levels in order to enhance their survivability enable more efficient deployment and employment of our HQs on operations improve command on the move and facilitate dispersed HQs For more information on the AWE20 project and the requirement to provide solutions to the AWE20 questions check the British Army website.

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ARESCOM Warfighting Competency Training

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Without a new concept to leverage the aggregate power of the full joint force, a war with China and Russia becomes more likely and more dangerous. While some past concept efforts originated within the services e. Accordingly, the bottom-up effort should be complemented by a more robust top-down approach. Such a holistic approach is necessary to create multiple dilemmas for an adversary in different domains that span the tactical to strategic levels. The service-led renaissance in American military thinking also reflects growing awareness that U.

As a result, the United States has less freedom of action to defend its security interests and support its allies and partners. The services face major obstacles in trying to independently develop approaches for great power competition and conflict. First, the current set of service concepts have not matured much beyond the working hypothesis level. In some cases, interservice dialogues have begun to make progress in areas of traditional service collaboration i. However, much work remains. Second, the concepts require additional rigorous examination and experimentation to assess their feasibility in light of sister-service concepts and, more importantly, within a joint and theater context.

Harry Harris, former commander of U.

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Indo-Pacific Command, inspired the U. Insights gleaned from real-world experimentation may reveal innovative methods for deploying the task force or other Army elements in support of the joint campaign. The Multi-Domain Task Force should not be a one-off. As noted by military historian Dr.

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Williamson Murray, the virtue of standalone experimentation units is that they can suspend disbelief and push boundaries in policy, authorities, relationships, operational context, and other realms without degrading readiness. Experimental units not only point the way to the future, they can also serve as a vehicle for exploring further doctrinal and conceptual possibilities. Given the complex interplay between domains and the still-immature theater implications of cyber and space capabilities, it is perhaps time to consider forming joint experimentation units or augmenting service-conducted experiments with joint capabilities.

Once the services agree internally how to conduct all-domain operations, another hurdle awaits —ensuring that the cohesive, lethal, and time-sensitive application of joint combat power addresses real-world warfighting needs. As lessons learned from Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada revealed, one cannot assume integration will naturally result from the concept development process any more than one can expect the services and alliance partners to develop compatible communications equipment despite a shared commitment to doing so, to say nothing of the numerous directives and technical standards for achieving interoperability.

Fully integrating the joint force is necessary to achieve what the U.

UK planning Army Warfighting Experiment 19 and 20, eyes MUM-T and C3 | Jane's

Convergence requires thinking at the operational level. Consequently, to develop and experiment effectively with convergence, the U. One approach the joint force commanders can take to facilitate integration is to decide in peacetime how they will organize their forces for war. Determining the command-and-control arrangements before war occurs will provide a baseline that the joint force can become proficient in during peacetime training.

DE&S and British Army launch the Army Warfighting Experiment (AWE) 20 experimentation project

In short, de-conflicting friendly forces to avoid fratricide has always been taken seriously by the U. But, this must not be confused with trying to simultaneously integrate battlefield activities from separate services against high-value enemy targets. The latter requires a degree of interdependence, coordination, and cooperation seldom seen in modern military history.

New concepts are developed in part because a gap exists between what a force can do now and what it might need to do in the future. The problem is that no single concept is optimized for all operational challenges.

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Yet, being able to deliver strategic, operational, and tactical fires against high-value targets requires penetration. The services should maintain high warfighting proficiency within their respective functional domains. However, they cannot, by themselves , guarantee the joint force can successfully conduct all-domain, large-scale, conventional operations around the globe. This can only be realized through an aggressive combatant command-level exercise program that requires joint force headquarters in concert with service component headquarters and service-provided forces to collectively engage in realistic and recurring multidomain-focused training exercises at scale.

The tension between service and joint readiness priorities is a perennial challenge. Moreover, combatant command headquarters seem unable to routinely provide response cells to support component-level exercises — a missed training opportunity that ends up requiring subordinate units to role-play as a higher headquarters for which few are manned, trained, or equipped. Even more pressing is the need for the joint force to subject an integrated version of service concepts or its own written concept to repeated evaluation during exercises.

Repetition will not only help assigned units become more proficient at accomplishing their joint missions, it will give the geographic combatant commanders mission-essential feedback necessary to further refine their joint warfighting concepts. The process of developing joint concepts has undergone several major changes in the past few decades; however, it is not yet optimized to meet the demands of the National Defense Strategy. Therefore, three initiatives should be considered to fill the voids discussed in this article.